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Foreword 
The China Society presents this summary as 
an aid to the understanding of the present sit· 
uation in China. 
Dr. Hornbeck, author of "Contemporary Pol· 
itics in the Far East," Lecturer on History of 
the Far East at Harvard University, Technical 
Adviser to the American Delegations at the 
Paris, the Washington and the Peking Confer· 
ences, is recognized as one of the foremost au· 
thorities on the politics of the Far East. 
A part of this survey appeared in the Bulletin 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations, January, 
1927. 
The Situation In China 
By STANLEY K. HORNBECK 
China is today in the throes of two great political 
efforts. First, rival leaders or factions are contend-
ing for power; some are struggling to extend, others 
to preserve the measure of authority which they 
have attained during the years since the overthrow of 
the Monarchy ( 1912). Second, most of those who, 
in China's vast population, are politically articulate 
are in revolt against the influence which foreign 
governments, foreign nationals and foreign ideas 
have acquired in their country. 
The wars which have been waged during the past 
ten years have been factional. Various leaders, 
groups and parties have been contending for a supre-
macy to which none has a lawful claim. Each has 
raised armies, collected revenues, and waged his or 
its contest against one or more of the others. A sem-
blance of central authority has been maintained in 
Peking; but at this moment even the Peking govern-
ment is self-appointed and has a narrowly limited 
authority. The city of Peking is fought for as a 
political prize, because: first, it is the traditional seat 
of authority; second, it possesses the physical equip-
ment of government; and, third, certain of the more 
important .sources of revenue still contribute to the 
exchequer located there. 
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During the past fourteen years, some eight polit-
ical leaders have held the highest office in Peking; 
some forty-two recognizable Cabinets have func-
tioned there; and some nine Parliaments have met. 
At the present moment there is no recognized Chief 
Executive. There is no Parliament in being. There 
is no constitution in force. There is no uniform 
system of laws. The work of elaborating new codes 
of law on western models has been carried for-
ward, and several of the codes have been declared 
in effect by Executive Mandate, but there are gaps, 
and certain codes which are nominally in effect 
have not been adopted by the recognized legal pro-
cesses prescribed in any of the Constitutions which 
have been, from time to time, in effect. 
Governments at Peking have been made and un-
made by military leaders. In 1924 President Tsao 
Kun's Government was overthrown by a coup 
d'etat manipulated by Feng Yu-hsiang, the "Chris-
tian General." Feng imprisoned Tsao Kun, and 
then, by agreement with Marshal Chang Tso-lin, 
of Manchuria, placed Tuan Chi-jui in authority as 
"Provisional Chief Executive." Tsao was held 
prisoner in the palace until, in the spring of 1926, 
Feng's forces were driven from Peking; he was 
then released, but was not restored to office. When, 
in April 1926, the combined forces of Chang Tso-
lin and Wu Pei-fu took Peking, Feng's forces 
withdrew to the northwest, and the Provisional 
Chief Executive, Tuan Chi-jui, left Peking hur-
riedly and unceremoniously. For several days there-
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after there existed no "central government." Finally 
a number of experienced officials and military lead-
ers, constituted themselves, with the assent of four 
northern "war lords," an acting government, with 
the designation "Regency Cabinet." 
There were at that time upon the stage four out-
standing ·military leaders. Each had his own army, 
each his own principality. In Manchuria, with 
seat of government at Mukden, Marshal Chang 
Tso-lin. Chang's power extended into the metro-
politan Province of Chihli and into Shantung, and 
he had a substantial measure of authority, but not 
control, in Peking. In central China, with base 
on the Peking-Hankow Railway, Wu Pei-fu. Wu 
was in command of a coalition of military forces 
no unit of which was absolutely his own. Chang 
Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu had cooperated in driving 
the "People's National Army" of Feng Yu-hsiang 
from Peking. Wu thus shared with Chang an in-
fluence at Peking. West of Kalgan, Feng Yu-
hsiang was in control of an indefinite area spoken 
of as the "Northwest." In central eastern China, 
north and south of the Yangtze River, Sun Chuang-
fang had effected a coalition of military forces 
which gave him supreme command but by no means 
unassailable authority in five rich provinces. In 
the South, that is Kwangtung and its hinterland, 
Chiang Kai-shek, commanding the armies of the 
Kuo Min Tang ("Nationalist Party") had consoli-
dated his power, with the aid of Russian advisers 
and officers (of Soviet persuasion), and was pre-
paring for a campaign northwards. 
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At Canton there had been developed since 1917 a 
government which claimed, as did the government 
at Peking, to be the government of (all) China. 
There Dr. Sun Yat-sen had been elected "President 
of China" ( 1921). There, shortly before his death, 
Dr. Sun had decided to accept assistance from Soviet 
Russia-a decision which produced a schism in his 
party-and had entrusted to General Chiang the 
task of creating an army with which to "unify" the 
country. The administration of Canton by the N a-
tionali st Government had been favorably comment-
ed on by many observers.* 
The long threatened northward advance ("march 
on Peking") of the Canton forces was launched 
early in the summer of 1926. Chiang Kai-shek's 
army took Changsha, crossed the Yangtze above 
Hankow, took Hanyang and its arsenal, then took 
Hankow, and later, after a siege of several weeks 
took Wuchang, and, proceeding down the river, 
took Kiukiang. The success of his armies increased 
Chiang Kai-shek's prestige and so materially dam-
aged Wu Pei-fu that not a few observers declared 
the latter "finished." Chiang has since pressed on, 
south of the Yangtze, and has just now (March 21, 
1927) taken the region around Shanghai. 
Although it should be clearly understood that 
these military operations are not those of a revolu-
tionary organization seeking to overthrow a legiti-
mate government, it should not be thought that 
•nr. Sun died in Peking in March , 1926, on the eve of a conference which he 
was to have had with northern "War Lords". 
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there is no more underlying all this act1v1ty than 
the interests and ambitions of the military leaders. 
There is a clash of ideas. There is a contest be-
tween comparatively conservative and compara-
tively radical groups. It is not, as it is so often 
put, a struggle between North China and South 
China. There is no political or economic line of 
cleavage in China. There is no party which is 
confined to the South; and there is no party which 
controls all of the North. One party, however, has 
nation-wide affiliations and has in every province 
some influence. This is the Kuo Min Tang, or 
Nationalist Party. The other parties are composed 
on a basis either of personal or of territorial affilia-
tions. The Kuo Min Party may be said to embody 
the spirit of the "revolution"; it carries on from 
the overthrow of the monarchy; it has a "plat-
form"; it talks of "popular government"; it repre-
sents the undisciplined and enthusiastic desire of a 
portion of the population of every province to break 
with tradition and throw off restraining and retard-
ing influences. 
It is, naturally, from the ranks of this party and 
its leaders that the most insistent of the fulmina-
tions of the Chinese against foreigners, foreign in-
fluence, foreign powers, emanate. In it are en-
rolled the majority, but by no means all, of the 
"western educated" students. It flourishes most in 
the South,-for the southern Chinese are by tem-
perament more revolutionary, more ardent than the 
northern Chinese, and South China has known more 
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of foreign contact and influence than has North 
China. From South China have gone most of 
China's emigrants; and from these emigrants there 
has come back into China a steady stream of agita-
tion and funds for revolutionary enterprises. South 
China has been the birthplace of most of the revo-
lutions of the Chinese against their Rulers, and in 
South China the spirit of revolt is most acute today. 
But it should not be thought that the Kuo Min 
Party and the South are alone indoctrinated with 
the ideas of revolt which are becoming daily more 
and more manifest in China. Chinese everywhere 
have shown during the past ten years increasing 
signs of a developing national self-consciousness. 
Ten years ago one heard in the foreign "conces-
sions" a general damning of the Chinese as a peo-
ple possessed of no patriotism. Today one hears 
in the same places a general damning of Chinese 
nationalism. There is unquestionably developing 
in China that conception of national interests and 
national rights which is called "patriotism." Not 
every Chinese, not one in ten, perhaps not one in 
a hundred, has what we would call a "conscious-
ness" or even an opinion with regard to political 
questions. The "public" consists of at most a few 
million citizens, those who either are educated or 
possess substantial means or wield military power. 
These constitute articulate China. Politically speak-
ing, they are the nation. Their number is sufficient 
to constitute what would be a considerable body 
politic in any state. Among them there is develop-
s 
ing, more and more, a solidarity of sentiment which 
has manifested itself for two decades in defensive 
effort to resist foreign influence and which is now 
manifesting itself in thought and action directed 
toward the destruction of the privileged position 
which has been accorded to or acquired by foreign 
nations and foreign nationals in China. 
The Chinese "Nationalists" are taking advantage 
of every evidence and opportunity to proclaim 
aloud to their own people and to the world that 
China has been and is being oppressed by the for-
eign Powers; that China is bound down by "un-
equal treaties"; that Chinese laws, customs, and 
manners are being corrupted by foreigners; and that 
foreign domination must be shaken off. The pres-
ent antipathy of the Chinese people appears to be 
not against foreigners as individuals or as alien per-
sons but against the forces, the system, the theories 
and practices of government of the foreign nations 
as manifested in relationships with · China. 
The Occident went to the Orient uninvited and 
unwanted. Navigators, merchants, missionaries and 
soldiers from the Occident forced themselves upon 
an unwilling Siam, an unwilling Japan and an un-
willing China. Of these countries, China, with her 
huge area, her enormous population, her laissez-
faire practices and principles of government, has 
not yet made the readjustment for which the new 
contacts call. The Chinese have never been accus-
tomed to precision, exact definitions, legal prescrip-
tions and contracts written out and agreed upon in 
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minute detail. In the dispensation of justice much 
of their law is to be found in the minds of the 
magistrates. In the making of contracts much is 
left to the attitudes and needs of the parties when 
performance becomes due. The Occidental found 
China's laws, conceptions of justice, methods of ad-
ministration different from those of the West. He 
found Chinese customs, conceptions of propriety, 
methods of doing business different from his. He 
found Chinese religions, conceptions of human ob-
ligations and methods of performance different 
from his. Where Chinese ideas and practices have 
differed from those of the Occident, the man from 
the West has insisted, in nine cases out of ten, that 
the Chinese idea is wrong and the Western right. 
A century and a half ago, the Chinese knew 
nothing about foreign governments, constitutions, 
republics, representative government, separation 
of powers, etc. They knew nothing of inter-
national law. They had no treaties (except cer-
tain old agreements with Russia) . The West 
insisted that they learn the.se things, taught them, 
and forced them to sign treaties. The Powers in-
sisted that China adopt and maintain a fixed sched-
ule of customs duties; they insisted that the Chinese 
admit Christian missionaries, allow them to preach 
and teach without obstacle and permit them to buy 
and own land wherever they might please for the 
prosecution of their enterprises. They insisted that, 
inasmuch as Chinese laws were different, those laws 
should not apply to "foreigners." Nevertheless, 
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they have sought constantly to bring it about that 
Chinese laws be altered upon the model of the 
Occidental legal systems. 
Foreign influence and foreign pressure contri-
buted to bringing on the revolution of 1911. Revo-
lutions the Chinese had had before, ·plenty of them, 
but never one which at the same time overthrew a 
dynasty, declared against the principle of monarchy, 
and undertook to establish a government based on 
principles of election, representation and responsi-
bility. 
When the governments of the foreign Powers 
dictated the provisions of the treaties which they 
compelled the Manchu rulers of China to sign, 
they wrote into these treaties some provisions call-
ing for performance which neither the Manchus 
nor any other Chinese government could enforce. 
Now, the Manchus and the Mandarinate who 
signed those contracts have disappeared. Today 
the Chinese people are convinced, rightly or wrong-
ly, that the rules and treaty provisions which the 
foreign governments cite as rightfully applicable 
to the contacts between China and the foreign Pow-
ers are inequitable and intolerably disadvantageous 
to one of the parties concerned, namely the Chinese. 
Moreover, they contend that neither the Chinese 
people nor the officials who represented them ever 
agreed to some of the provisions in the sense of the 
interpretations which foreigners have chosen to put 
upon them. 
11 
At the Washington Conference (1921-1922) steps 
were taken and agreements were entered into look-
ing toward the revision and adjustment of various 
of the treaty provisions. Among other things it was 
agreed that the rates of duty of the Chinese treaty 
tariff should be increased and that a Commission 
should be created to examine China's laws, courts, 
prisons and administration of justice, and to report 
on facts and make recommendations in relation to · 
the problem of legal jurisdiction in China. 
The Special Conference on the Chinese Tariff 
met in October, 1925, and worked for nine months. 
It did not succeed in arriving at the agreements 
· necessary to carry out the provisions of the Wash-
ington Treaty. The nearest approach to definite 
action by the Conference was the adoption by the 
Delegates on November 17, 1925, of a resolution, 
the substance of which was intended to be incor-
porated in a treaty, declaring that China should be 
permitted to enjoy tariff autonomy, putting a na-
tional tariff law into effect, in 1929, and that China 
should abolish the system of levying internal duties 
upon merchandise in transit. Inasmuch as the 
treaty has not been negotiated, this resolution has, 
presumably, no legal standing, but its adoption 
has had the effect of giving the Chinese the im-
pression that their right to enjoy tariff autonomy 
has been admitted and affirmed by qualified repre-
sentatives of the foreign Powers. 
In July, 1926, the Tariff Conference adjourned 
sine die. For months there had been no formal full 
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sessions. The delegates of the foreign Powers had 
stayed on in Peking, in spite of wars which were 
waged around the capital, while the Government 
fell, while the Provisional Chief Executive and 
seven of the original ten Chinese Delegates left,-
they had stayed on, hoping that a new treaty might 
be negotiated. The adjournment came not because 
the Powers had not wanted and had not tried to 
carry out and go beyond-far beyond-the provi-
sions of the Washington Treaty; it came because 
and not until after the Nationalist Government 
(Canton) and the People's National Army ( Feng 
Yu-hsiang) served notice in the middle of July 
that they would respect no treaty, no matter what 
the provisions, entered into by the P~king authori-
ties. Before the adjournment, the delegates of the 
foreign Powers declared unanimously that they 
would be glad to go on with the Conference when-
ever the Chinese Delegates should be in position to 
resume the negotiations. 
The Commission on Extraterritoriality met in 
January, 1926, pursued its investigations, and pro-
duced in the middle of September a report signed 
by all of the Commissioners. The text of this re-
port was made public in December ( 1926). In it 
the Commissioners have given an accurate account 
of the laws and the! administration of justice in 
contemporary China. They have made suggestions 
with regard to steps which should be taken both by 
China and by the foreign Powers to bring about a 
situation in which it may be safe to abolish the 
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extraterritorial system; also, suggestions with re-
gard to the removal of abuses while the system con-
tinues in existence. Among other things, they have 
pointed out that the new codes have not been put 
into effect by legally prescribed processes, that some 
have not been put into effect at all, that some are 
not yet completed, and that the work of preparing 
some has not even been begun. 
This whole problem of legal reform in China is 
one which presents great difficulties. Chinese con-
ceptions of law, justice, punishment, etc., differ 
radically at some points from those of the Occident. 
Even among nations in the Occident, there are sub-
stantial differences. Yet the effort is being made to 
produce in and for China a body of laws which 
will meet with the approval of all of the important 
Treaty Powers. China's new codes are being based 
principally upon French and German models or 
Japanese adaptations thereof. The inevitable result 
has been and will be that the codes contain many 
provisions which are not an outgrowth of Chinese 
thought and experience, which are inconsistent with 
Chinese conceptions, and which will run counter to 
traditional Chinese habits and practices. If China's 
new laws satisfy the foreigners, will they be suited 
to the Chinese? If they are suited to the Chinese, 
will they satisfy the foreigners? Can there be pro-
duced a system of law which, both as to regulations 
and administration, can be applied equally, with 
justice and with satisfaction, to the Chinese people 
and to the nationals of some twenty foreign Powers 
who reside, travel and do business in China? 
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Thus, notwithstanding the pledges made and the 
steps which have been taken looking toward their 
fulfillment, the simple fact remains that up to this 
moment nothing conclusive has been accomplished 
in reference to the general program of treaty re-
vision (i.e. in reference to the old commercial and 
other treaties) for which the Chinese contended at 
Paris eight years ago.* 
The Treaty Powers have, however, done much 
during the past ten years toward giving up special 
rights and privileges. At Paris, the German and 
Austrian privileges (except Shantung) were sur-
rendered back to China. At Washington (and im-
mediately after), Shantung was restored; the for-
eign post-offices were removed; negotiations were 
begun for restoration of Weihaiwei; provisions 
were agreed upon to ensure respect for China's 
sovereignty and discontinuance of foreign aggres-
sions. Most of the Powers have either given up their 
rights in or remitted their shares of the Boxer in-
demnity. At Peking a real effort was made to solve 
the tariff problem. The Extraterritoriality Com-
mission produced a substantial body of practical 
suggestions and recommendations. In January 1927 
the Mixed Courts at Shanghai were turned over 
to the Chinese authorities. The foreigners at Shang-
hai have taken definite steps toward admitting 
Chinese to participation in the government of the 
International Settlement. t 
*Negotiations with regard to several of these treaties have recently been entered 
into between China and the foreign Powers individually concerned. 
tThe Chinese now demand a "S0-50" representation. 
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Banditry is ever present in China, and rebellion 
in some part or parts of the country is almost a 
.chronic condition. There would probably be civil 
warfare in China today even if there had been no 
foreign influence, even if there were no ·treaties. 
The late Manchu dynasty and Chinese officialdom 
have a heavy responsibility for the political chaos 
which prevails. The charge that the foreign Pow-
ers and their nationals are principally responsible 
for it will not stand. But to the kind of trouble 
which prevails in China today, the impact of the 
Occident gave the original impetus, and foreign 
Powers and peoples continue to make direct and 
indirect contributions. Foreigners constituted them-
selves China's tutors. Foreigners wrote the treaties. 
Foreigners took concessions in China. Foreigners 
financed various enterprises in China. Now, solici-
tous with regard to their privileges, their invest-
ments and their trade, some of them participate in 
the formation of Chinese political combinations 
and contribute to the successes or defeat of Chinese 
military leaders, their contribution and participa-
tion being determined by their view of the effect 
upon interests which they regard as vested. Thus, 
for example, notwithstanding the existence of a 
diplomatic agreement whereby the governments of 
the principal treaty Powers have agreed not to per-
mit their nationals to sell arms to China, the Chi-
nese find it possible to purchase from certain for-
eign sources, arms, munitions and equipment in any 
amount for which they are prepared to pay cash. 
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Of all the foreign governments, that of Soviet 
Russia is probably the most active in the prosecu-
tion of a positive China policy. Russia is no longer 
party to any of the old style treaties . or agreements 
with China and the Soviet Government openly 
opposes the efforts of all the Powers which seek to 
follow the principle of cooperative action. The 
objective underlying Russia's China policy appears 
to be that of making trouble, trouble for everybody1 
trouble particularly for the "capitalistic" states, 
trouble for China. It may well be doubted whether 
the Soviet leaders entertain any hope of "bolshe-
vizing" China in the sense of making China com-
mumsttc. If they have such hope it will be vain. 
But there can be no doubt that they seek to in-
doctrinate the Chinese with the idea of revolt-
and in this they are being highly successful. Dur-
ing the past two years they have been the main 
foreign support of the People's National army in the 
North (Feng) and the Nationalist Government and 
army (Canton-Hankow) in the South. They have 
supplied money, munitions, advisers and officers. 
It is estimated that the various Chinese armies 
total in the aggregate between 1,200,000 and 1,500,-
000 men. The Mukden, Shanghai and Canton-
Hankow forces have their own arsenals, each turn-
ing out rifles and small arms ammunition. Muk-
den has the most extensive ordnance plants and 
Chang Tso-lin has equipped his forces with light 
field guns and trench mortars. He is building up 
a large aircraft equipment. It is generally con-
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sidered that Feng and Chiang Kai-shek have the 
best trained and best ordered soldiers. Feng has 
no independent sources of equipment or supplies. 
He has been dependent on Russia. In fighting 
quality, it is generally felt that the men of the 
north are superior to those of the south, with the 
exception of those of Hunan, but in morale the 
Nationalist armies are superior. Financially, Muk-
den and Shanghai are more independent than are 
the other centers. Feng controls a relatively in-
fertile and non-lucrative principality. Wu owes 
much of his weakness to lack of funds. The Can-
ton-Hankow Government has developed a sub-
stantial independent income. 
Each of the major military leaders is an abso-
lute ruler, exercising power of life and death and 
collecting taxes at will throughout the region over 
which he has control, except that, in the region 
under control of the Nationalist Government, the 
military authority is-in theory at least-subordi-
nate to that of the Executive Committee. 
In many of the campaigns money is more de-
cisive than bullets. Both officers and men fre-
quently go over from one side to the other. Cities 
fall without a battle. Armies temporarily vic-
torious seem strangely reluctant to follow up and 
annihilate the enemy. All the while the people 
are made to pay the bills-and the bank accounts 
of the "tuchuns" grow. 
China's public finances are in a state of com-
plete chaos. Except for the Customs and a portion 
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of the Salt revenues, Peking is rece1vmg nothing 
from the provinces; taxes everywhere are being 
collected by the authorities locally in control and 
are being expended almost entirely upon military 
activities. The whole of the revenue derived from 
the operation of the railroads is taken and expended 
in that way. Nothing is being put back into equip-
ment and no new lines are being constructed, ex-
cept in Manchuria. 
Nevertheless, taking the country as a whole, pri-
vate business appears to increase. This is unques-
tionably true with regard to foreign trade. The 
figures of the Customs revenue show an increase 
every year. But the amount of this foreign trade 
which is handled by foreign firms located in China 
shows relatively a decrease. The Chinese are ap-
parently taking over, bit by bit, the importing and 
exporting business. Military operations, banditry, 
issues of paper currency and other irregularities 
tend to retard the development of trade; but it must 
be remembered that only a portion of China's area 
. and a part of her people are directly affected by 
these factors. Opium is being grown in many 
areas in larger amount probably than in any pre-
vious period in China's history,-and the armies 
take the profits. 
Among the adverse effects of the political and 
military turmoil, probably the most unfortunate in 
the long run is the fact that educational develop-
ment is at a standstill. China has today only some 
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seven million boys and gir Is in her schools, less 
than one in fifty of her population. There never 
has been even an approach to adequate provision 
for primary schools and middle schools properly 
to feed the established colleges and universities, and 
in the government colleges and universities there 
has not been in recent years a high standard. Now, 
almost no provision is being made even for main-
tenance, to say nothing of expansion. Were it not 
for the missionary institutions and the Indemnity 
College at Peking (Tsinghua), opportunities for 
higher: education in China would be almost en-
tirely lacking. Even the missionary institutions 
have suffered greatly and are operating under han-
dicaps. Some have been compelled recently to 
close. The revolt against foreign influence, the 
general insurgency of Young China, and the sym-
pathetic tolerance of some of the missionary staffs 
have produced a tendency tO, despise discipline, 
with results seriously detrimental to scholarship. 
The latest developments in the domestic military 
contest have been the realignment of northern lead-
ers under the direction of Chang Tso-lin in order 
to stop the northward advance of the so far vic-
torious Canton-Hankow forces and the steady ad-
vance of the latter eastward in the Yangtze Valley 
south of the River. Sun Chuan-fang has been 
eliminated; Chang Tsung-chang, who succeeded 
him in the Shanghai region, has been evicted from 
that region; and the Nationalist (Canton-Hankow) 
army is in control of the Shanghai area. The for-
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eign Powers have at Shanghai substantial naval and 
military forces, for the protection of the limited 
area (International Settlement and French conces- · 
sian) which is under foreign administrative juris-
diction. The Wu Pei-fu block, Wu himself being 
apparently no longer in control of it, still sits 
astride of the Peking-Hankow Railway north of 
Hankow. Feng Yu-hsiang has advanced southward 
through Shensi and his armies lie to the west near 
to and constantly menacing the Wu Pei-fu group. 
Feng is a member of the Nationalist Party and an 
ally of the Canton-Hankow Government. · 
In the revolt against the foreign Powers, the 
Chinese have found organized boycotts decidedly 
effective and are having resort with increased fre-
quency to strikes. The combination of the two, as 
prosecuted at Canton, has had a very serious effect 
upon British interests and has visibly affected Brit-
ish policy during the past year. Both the boycott 
and the strike are two-edged and dangerous weap-
ons, but the Chinese are more skillful in the use of 
defensive than of offensive measures. The recent 
propaganda among the masses is forging a weapon 
which may prove more dangerous to its creators 
than to those against whom it is directed. The 
foreign Powers are reluctant to u!e force and may 
be expected to do so only to prevent violence. 
There is one factor in the domestic struggle 
which holds out a substantial promise of improve-
ment. It is the fact that a Nationalist Movement 
is in full swing and that this movement is tending 
to produce, in the political and military fields, 
some· effective organization. 
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TheN ationalist Movement is a bigger thing than 
the Nationalist Party. The Party is at once one 
of the producers and one of the products of the 
movement. The Nationalist Government is a child 
of the Party. Within the Party and within the 
Government there are three factions, the Radicals, 
the Moderates, and the Conservatives. TheN ation-
alist armies are still another thing. There is the 
Nationalist Army of Chiang Kai-shek, an instru-
ment of the Nationalist Government ( Hankow), 
and there is the People's National Army of Feng 
Yu-hsiang, allied with but not controlled by the 
Nationalist Government. Each of these is less than 
the Nationalist Movement. 
There is warrant for optimism over the Nation-
alist Movement-which is nation-wide and which 
extends beyond the field of politics,-because na-
tional self-consciousness, expressed in a general 
awakening, is making toward progress, toward na-
tional unity, toward independence. There is even 
warrant for hopefulness with regard to the Nation-
alist Government. But the oligarchy which has 
created and which today is that Government (Han-
kow) has not yet made itself the de facto ruler of 
the major portion of China's territory; nor has it 
yet established an effective civil administration 
throughout the considerable area which its armies 
have occupied. 
Events of the past few days (March 20-31), most 
conspicuously the attack upon and killing of foreign-
ers at Nanking, suggest that there is within the N a-
tionalist Army indiscipline and lack of authority and 
22 
indicate that the work of the Propaganda Bureau of 
the Left Wing is creating-or has created-an instru-
ment of terror which, unless suppressed, must in-
evitably alienate the moderately and conservatively 
minded elements among both Chinese and foreign 
sympathizers with the Nationalist cause. 
What may happen next within China, what may 
happen as between the foreign Powers and China, 
how long it may be before a stable central govern-
ment is evolved in China, what may be the character 
of that government and who its head, time only will 
reveal. In considering China's past, present and 
future, it is necessary at all times to take into con-
sideration the size of the country and the enormous 
number of the population. China is changing 
neither very rapidly nor very slowly. Her mass 
is such that she can sustain no rapid acceleration 
and no rapid diminution of speed. The one thing 
that is certain is that she is no longer travelling in 
the orbit which marked her course during many 
centuries. She has diverged from that line. She 
is changing. She will have to undergo much 
change before a new stability is reached. Mere 
impatience on the part either of her own people or 
of foreigners will achieve nothing. Patience on the 
part of both, constructive effort on the part of the 
Chinese themselves and demonstrated willingness 
to assist on the part of foreigners are the only 
factors which may serve to shorten the period of 
turmoil and readjustment through which, like it 
or not, China must go and the world must watch 
her go. 
23 
The China Society of America 
is an organization, incorporated in 
1913 under the laws of the State of 
New York, to promote friendly re-
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